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Subsidiarity as a Principle of EU Governance
Katarzyna Granat
I Introduction
Today’s European Union (EU) has a complex structure of cooperative fed-
eralism that raises substantial challenges of governance. The subsidiarity 
principle has emerged as the pre-eminent organising principle for the allo-
cation of powers among the EU’s different levels of government; that is, 
among the European institutions such as the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament, and the Member States and their regional or local gov-
ernment structures.
Following its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty, the subsidiarity 
principle has been elevated in status by the Lisbon Treaty through the 
introduction of a specific, formal protocol for the assessment and enforce-
ment of subsidiarity in all EU legislation. Commensurate with its increased 
legal status, the subsidiarity principle and the issues it raises have kept 
both scholars and practitioners in institutions, parliaments and govern-
ments engaged in recent years.
Against this background, this chapter describes the key aspects of the 
subsidiarity principle, including its roots and substantive content and 
shows subsidiarity at work in specific cases of governance. The chapter 
highlights the contribution of subsidiarity to the European project but also 
underlines its shortcomings and presents proposals for reform.
At its core, the principle of subsidiarity raises questions about the 
appropriate place for political and legal power.1 It is applicable to the exer-
cise of competences in areas shared between Member States and the EU.2 
Subsidiarity is ‘called upon to arbitrate the tension between integration and 
1  G. de Búrca, ‘Re-Appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’, Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 7/99, 43.
2  A. G. Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’ (1994) 19 EL Rev 268, 269.
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274 european perspectives
proximity in all matters dealt with by the Union and its Member States’.3 
Being a ‘constitutional safeguard of federalism’, subsidiarity attempts to 
restrain the EU’s exercise of shared powers.4 In other words, subsidiarity 
‘only determines whether in a particular case, which is already within 
Community competence, action should be taken at the Community or at 
the national level’.5
II Background of the Subsidiarity Principle
The principle of subsidiarity expressed in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) organises the system of EU governance by declar-
ing that ‘in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’. As 
further detailed in that provision, the EU institutions apply subsidiarity in 
the legislative process and the national parliaments ensure its compliance 
in accordance with Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality included in the Lisbon Treaty.
III Origins of the Idea of Subsidiarity
The roots of the modern notion of subsidiarity can be traced to Pope Pius 
XI’s Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931).6 In the Encyclical the Pope dis-
cusses a principle of social order that reflects the principle of subsidiarity:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accom-
plish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, 
so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance 
of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very 
3  K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: 
Keeping the Balance of Federalism’ (1993) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, 848.
4  R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 247.
5  A. G. Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (1992) 29 CML Rev 1079, 
1082.
6  See e.g. J. Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 
18 et seq.; D. Z. Cass, ‘The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the 
Division of Powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29 CML Rev 1107, 1110.
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nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy 
and absorb them.7
The quote expresses a preference for allocating responsibilities to the lower 
levels of organisation, as long as they are capable to exercise them effec-
tively, mirroring the two key elements of subsidiarity as known in the EU.
Still, important differences between the European and the Catholic 
versions of subsidiarity remain. The EU subsidiarity is narrowly focused 
on democratic public bodies; the Catholic version considers society as a 
whole.8 Moreover, the EU subsidiarity principle is not a derivative of its 
Catholic understanding, but might have developed independently from 
Quadragesimo Anno.9
Federalism and liberalism, especially in the German tradition, pro-
vide alternative intellectual roots of subsidiarity.10 The German federalist 
notion of the state focuses on the different components of the state, their 
functions and relationships amongst each other. For example, the work of 
Althusius, von Humboldt and Hegel offers clues of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple.11 Liberalist theory, in turn, contains elements of subsidiarity as an 
organising principle: in the liberalist tradition the state is legitimate only 
to the extent it is organised from the bottom up and thus in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity.12 However, there are limits to this paral-
lel as the liberalist perspective focuses on the relation of the individual and 
the state, and arguably has less to say on intermediary levels of organi-
sation, while the subsidiarity principle can be applied to each layer of 
government.13
IV Development of Subsidiarity in German and EU Law
A Germany
From the German scholastic tradition, the subsidiarity principle found its 
way into the German Basic Law and from there into the EU. Although the 
subsidiarity principle is not explicitly included in the Basic Law the argu-
ment can be made that it is part of the German constitution.
7  Quadragesimo Anno, point 79, English translation available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/
pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html.
8  N. W. Barber, ‘The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 ELJ 308, 310.
9  Ibid. See also Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (above n. 6), 71.
10  Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (above n. 6), 35.
11  Ibid., 37.
12  Ibid., 45.
13  Ibid., 46.
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The historical background to the creation of the Basic Law of 1949 sug-
gests an environment receptive to the subsidiarity principle even though 
it did not enter the constitutional text itself. The draft prepared by the 
Constitutional Convention at Herrenchiemsee in 1948 tried to introduce 
formally the subsidiarity principle, an attempt that ultimately failed for 
several reasons.14 The drafters at Herrenchiemsee shied away from using 
the term subsidiarity because of its potential religious connotations.15 
Furthermore, it was felt that there was no need to explicitly introduce sub-
sidiarity because Article 1 of the proposed draft already included a firm 
commitment against an overreaching state.16
Following the convention at Herrenchiemsee the final text of the Basic 
Law was prepared and approved by the Parliamentary Council of 1949. 
Again no explicit reference to subsidiarity was made but arguably this 
should not be interpreted as a rejection of the principle.17 Instead, the 
Council expected the Basic Law to be of a provisional nature and thus 
refrained from entering areas that were not yet fully developed such as 
the developing economic and cultural elements of nascent post-war 
Germany.18 However, overall, the drafters of the Basic Law were driven by 
the general idea of moving away from the collectivist state of the recent 
past to an order based on ethical individualism.19
Finally, the Basic Law created a state structure that was inherently fed-
eral and this federalist outlook carried with it the idea of subsidiarity.20 
The Länder that were part of the process of creating and approving of the 
constitution had an interest in limiting the powers of the federal level to 
the necessary minimum.21
Beyond these indications for the presence of the subsidiarity principle in 
the minds of the drafters of the Basic Law at the time we can also consider 
the text itself and look for provisions reflecting that principle.22 For exam-
ple, and most fundamentally, the federal structure of the German state is 
built up from below. Article 30 of the Basic Law on the sovereign powers 
of the Länder states that the Länder exercise the state powers unless spe-
cifically provided otherwise by the Basic Law. Certain areas are explicitly 
14  Ibid., 143.
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid.
17  Ibid., 145.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid., 146.
20  Ibid., 147.
21  Ibid., 147.
22  Ibid., 223 et seq.
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allocated to the federal level (Article 73), whilst in other cases the Basic 
Law establishes certain conditions that determine whether the Länder or 
the state should act (Article 72).
Article 72 of the Basic Law in its original form simply required that a 
law met certain conditions specifically relating to ‘the uniformity of living 
conditions beyond the territory of any Land’ for the federal level to be able 
to act in that matter. This original wording was found to be non-justiciable 
as any law could easily be drafted such as to fulfil this requirement.23
Since 1994 Article 72(2) of the Basic Law provides that in the field of 
concurrent legislative competences the Federation should act ‘if and to the 
extent that the establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout 
the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity ren-
ders federal regulation necessary in the national interest’. In particular, the 
newly added necessity clause has proved to carry a restrictive force for fed-
eral legislation requiring in each case the state to demonstrate a specific 
need to act. This amended provision can thus be seen as a prototypical 
expression of the subsidiarity principle in constitutional law.24 It grants 
primacy to the federal level in the exercise of competence shared with the 
Länder, in the sense that when the conditions of Article 72(2) of the Basic 
Law are fulfilled and the federal level decides to act then this matter is 
closed to the Länder.25 However, the federal government is required to jus-
tify its actions with reference to the conditions enumerated in Article 72(2) 
of the Basic Law.26 Note that the federal government is not obligated to act 
in all matters that concern equivalent living conditions and legal or eco-
nomic unity: if the Länder can achieve the relevant objectives themselves, 
for example by adjusting their respective laws or jointly coordinating new 
legislation, then this is a valid alternative to the action at the federal level.27 
Both these aspects are arguably also present in the EU subsidiarity prin-
ciple: first, once the EU decides to act and the conditions are met then the 
Member States can no longer regulate on their own and, second, there is 
no compulsion on the EU to act in all cases where the national level cannot 
achieve the objective sufficiently and where it would be better achieved at 
the EU level.
Article 72(2) of the Basic Law prescribes certain limits to the appli-
cability of the subsidiarity principle. First, it speaks to the exercise of 
23  Ibid., 230.
24  Ibid., 358.
25  Ibid., 359.
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid., 360.
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competence by two levels only – the federal and the Länder level – thereby 
excluding other units of government such as municipalities, and civic 
organisations.28 In comparison, the Lisbon Treaty included for the first 
time as the locus of the exercise of competence the ‘central level or at 
regional and local level’ of the Member States, establishing a distinction 
that was missing in the Maastricht Treaty which simultaneously highlights 
that the national level itself is multilayered.29 Second, Article 72(4) of the 
Basic Law leaves discretion to the federal level about returning compe-
tences to the lower level if and when the conditions of Article 72(2) of the 
Basic Law are no longer fulfilled, instead of automatically returning such 
matters to the Länder.30 In contrast, the TEU does not provide for a similar 
provision on when the competence should be returned to be exercised by 
the Member States.
Hence Article 72(2) of the Basic Law requires a dual test examin-
ing whether there is a case for legislation at the federal level in addition 
to reviewing whether the legislation goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives set in that provision.31 The Basic Law granted the 
Federal Constitutional Court a possibility to review the compatibility of 
federal legislation with the subsidiarity principle, on the application of the 
Bundesrat or of the government or legislature of a Land.32 In contrast to 
the judicial review, a political safeguard of subsidiarity, which would have 
included granting the Bundesrat a role as a parliamentary watchdog of 
subsidiarity principle, did not gain the necessary support.33
The Federal Constitutional Court has actively fulfilled its role, building 
case law on the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. However, the 
Court’s interpretation of the tests involved in Article 72(2) of the Basic 
Law remains unclear, in the sense that the Court has not given precise 
criteria as to what the ‘equal living conditions’ or ‘national interest’ are.34 
28  Ibid.
29  De Búrca, ‘Re-Appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ (above n. 1), 16.
30  Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (above n. 6), 360.
31  G. Taylor, ‘Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle’ (2006) 4 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 115, 120.
32  Article 93(2a) of the Basic Law. This judicial safeguard did not exist before 1994 since both 
the German scholarship and the Federal Constitutional Court perceived Article 72(2) of 
the Basic Law as expressing a political decision of the federal legislator to legislate. See M. 
Rau, ‘Subsidiarity and Judicial Review in German Federalism: The Decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in the Geriatric Nursing Act Case’ (2003) 4 GLJ 223, 227.
33  Deutscher Bundestag, Bericht der Gemeinsamen Verfassungskommission, Drucksache 
12/6000, 5.11.93, 33.
34  Rau, ‘Subsidiarity and Judicial Review in German Federalism’ (n. 32), 233.
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This state of affairs resembles the European discussion on the subsidiarity 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dis-
cussed below. Despite such limitations, a series of cases where the Court 
has found the federal legislation incompatible with the subsidiarity prin-
ciple (e.g. the ‘Junior Professors’ case35) have led to a further amendment 
of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law in 2006, restricting its applicability to a 
limited number of subject areas of concurrent competence.36 Specifically, 
the subsidiarity test now only applies to subjects such as, for example, resi-
dence of foreign nationals, public welfare, law relating to economic mat-
ters (mining, industry, trade, commerce etc.), regulation of educational 
training or state liability.
B EU
The idea of subsidiarity in the EU can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome 
of 1957.37 Some of the provisions of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) Treaty deal with questions concerning the distribution and exer-
cise of competences between the Community and the Member States and 
explore possible approaches and criteria that are reminiscent of the later 
subsidiarity principle. For example, Article 100 EEC Treaty concerning 
the approximation of laws granted the Council a competence regarding 
laws that ‘have a direct incidence on the establishment or functioning of 
the Common Market’. In addition, Article 235 EEC Treaty allowed the 
Council to legislate in areas where the Treaty does not explicitly give it a 
competence when it ‘appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of 
the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community’.
Scholars have found in these provisions reflections of the idea of sub-
sidiarity as well as aspects of its later implementation such as conditions 
setting out necessity for the EU to act.38 Similarly, the concept of direc-
tives established in Article 189 EEC Treaty incorporates aspects of subsidi-
arity: the EU level sets out the overall objective and leaves it to the Member 
States to implement laws to achieve the objective.39 However, overall these 
35  G. Taylor, ‘Germany: A Slow Death of Subsidiarity?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Comparative Law 139, 143.
36  Ibid., 146.
37  Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union’ 
(above n. 3), 852.
38  C. Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (Nomos, 
1996), 31–5.
39  Ibid.
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connections appear peripheral and do not present tangible direct evidence 
of the presence of the subsidiarity principle as early as the Rome Treaty.40
This changed later on in the run-up to the reforming treaties and later 
the Maastricht Treaty. An early draft proposal for an EU Treaty by the 
European Parliament (EP) in 1984 both emphasized the multilayered 
nature of the EU as well as explicitly called upon the subsidiarity prin-
ciple in circumscribing its competences.41 Subsidiarity as such was first 
included in the Treaty text in the Single European Act of 1987, where it 
concerned Community action in the area of environmental policy and 
limited Community action in that field to cases where the objectives of 
the policy can be better achieved at the Community level than by Member 
States individually.42
The Maastricht Treaty subsequently took the notion further and first 
defined the ‘clear legal core of subsidiarity’, that forms the basis of subsidi-
arity today.43 During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty the Member 
States adopted different stances towards subsidiarity reflecting their idi-
osyncratic interests and political conditions, which can be illustrated with 
reference to the positions of the UK and Germany. In the UK, subsidi-
arity was primarily seen as a restraint on what was perceived as an exces-
sive tendency towards political integration, which clashed with the strong 
established notion of primacy of the UK Parliament in all matters.44 In 
contrast, the debate in Germany was driven by the Länder and their fear 
of losing powers relative to the federal state and the EU. As such, subsidi-
arity was viewed mostly as a tool for implementing the German federalist 
model in the EU.45 Furthermore, the Länder together with the European 
organisations of the regions pushed for recognition of the three levels of 
organisation (Union, national state and region) that appeared only in the 
subsequent Lisbon version of the subsidiarity principle.46
At its introduction with the Maastricht Treaty, subsidiarity was wel-
comed as ‘an important, if undervalued’ part of the relation between 
Community and Member States and a form of division of power between 
them,47 yet it was simultaneously criticised as a step back, weakening the 
40  Ibid.
41  Ibid., 36.
42  Article 130r(4) EEC Treaty.
43  De Búrca, ‘Re-Appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ (above n. 1), 14.
44  Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (above n. 38), 51 
et seq.
45  Ibid., 53.
46  Ibid., 54.
47  Cass, ‘The Word that Saves Maastricht?’ (above n. 6), 1134.
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Community and slowing down European integration.48 Although some 
indicated that even without subsidiarity ‘one could [also] have lived quite 
happily and in peace in the European home’, the principle was here to stay.49
C Reimport of EU Subsidiarity to the German Basic Law
Article 23 of the German Basic Law, which was introduced in 1992 before 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by Germany, establishes the prin-
ciples of participation of Germany in the EU and is a reimport of the sub-
sidiarity principle to the German constitutional system.50 According to this 
provision, Germany participates in the development of an EU ‘that is com-
mitted to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and 
to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of 
basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law’.
The article establishes the subsidiarity principle as an important tie 
between German law and EU law, working in both directions at the same 
time. It provides a policy framework for Germany’s participation in the 
EU. For instance, the representatives of Germany at the EU level have to 
adhere to the subsidiarity principle in both the division and the exercise of 
competences.51 Furthermore, by committing Germany to a Europe based 
on subsidiarity, it reflects and re-emphasises the prominence of the prin-
ciple for German constitutional law.52 Embedding subsidiarity in the EU 
Treaties, Germany’s own commitment to the principle for the organisation 
of the federal state received renewed attention.53
V Components of the Subsidiarity Principle
The EU principle of subsidiarity has two dimensions: a material and a 
procedural one.54 There are two prongs to the verification of material sub-
sidiarity, labelled the national insufficiency test and the comparative effi-
ciency test.55 The first test – the Union shall act ‘only if and in so far as the 
48  Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (above n. 5), 1105.
49  P. Pescatore, ‘Mit der Subsidiarität leben’ in Ole Due et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich 
Everling (Nomos, 1995), 1094.
50  Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht (above n. 6), 334.
51  Ibid., 371.
52  Ibid., 371.
53  Ibid., 334.
54  A. E. de Noriega, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford University Press, 
2002), 105.
55  Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (above n. 4).
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objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States’ – means that a Member State has ‘inadequate means at 
its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed action’.56 The sec-
ond test requires that the Union shall act if the objectives of the proposed 
action can rather ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level’. Hence, the EU should not act ‘unless it 
could better achieve the objectives of the proposed action’.57
The principle of subsidiarity in the EU is based on a test that is different 
from that in German law. In comparison to the German Basic Law, which 
recognises the ‘necessity’ of federal action for the achievement of equiva-
lent living conditions and legal and economic unity, the TEU looks at the 
insufficient achievement of the objective of the action at the national level 
and their comparatively more efficient achievement at the EU level. This 
can be contrasted with Article 72(2) of the Basic Law which in principle 
allows the federal level to act even if the Länder could achieve the relevant 
objective as long as the action concerns the establishment of equivalent 
living conditions or the maintenance of legal or economic unity.
In addition, the EU version of subsidiarity does not refer to the notion 
of ‘necessary in the national interest’ indicated in Article 72(2) of the 
Basic Law. Instead it assesses which level of government is better placed to 
achieve the objective of the legislation, thereby allocating powers by com-
parison rather than exclusion. In this sense, the EU subsidiarity principle 
can be seen to embody federal proportionality, asking whether EU action 
‘unnecessarily restricts national autonomy’;58 that is, without providing 
sufficient benefits.
Finally, within the criteria justifying federal action, the EU notion of 
subsidiarity does not require legislation to necessarily be in the interest of 
the nation, like in Germany, or rather the Union; however, it has to aim at 
achieving one of the objectives of the Treaties. Nonetheless, the objective 
of the legislation is not questioned per se by subsidiarity, only at what level 
of government a given objective can be best achieved.
Since the EU subsidiarity principle was first introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, the tests have been elaborated on. First, the ‘Overall 
Approach’ annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council meeting in 
Edinburgh established guidelines providing for more clarity in answering 
56  K. Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community Competence in the Field of Education’ (1994) 1 
Columbia Journal of European Law 1, 22.
57  Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (above n. 4), 250.
58  Ibid., 263.
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the question of whether the Community should act.59 These include, first, 
testing whether the issue at stake has transnational aspects that cannot be 
satisfactorily regulated by Member States.60 Second, the guidelines suggest 
that a Community action satisfies the subsidiarity principle when ‘actions 
by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with 
the requirements of the Treaty . . . or would otherwise significantly damage 
Member States’ interests’. Three examples are given in the text: the need to 
correct distortion of competition; avoidance of disguised restrictions on 
trade; and strengthening of economic and social cohesion. The final guid-
ance principle makes the compliance with the subsidiarity principle condi-
tional on the ‘clear benefits [of Community action] by reason of its scale or 
effects compared with action at the level of Member States’. In addition, the 
‘Overall Approach’ provides that subsidiarity reasoning has to be ‘substan-
tiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators’.61 The 
‘Overall Approach’ also instructs the EU institutions to observe the sub-
sidiarity principle when they examine Community proposals. Specifically, 
the Commission is obliged to include a subsidiarity assessment in its pre-
legislative consultations, as well as a recital in the proposal that assesses 
the compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity and, where necessary, 
provide more detail in an explanatory memorandum.62
Second, the Inter-Institutional Agreement established that the 
Commission, while exercising its right of initiative, and the EP and the 
Council, while exercising their respective powers, should ‘take into 
account’ the subsidiarity principle.63 In addition, the agreement provides 
that the explanatory memorandum in any Commission proposal should 
include a subsidiarity assessment.
The development of these guidelines culminated in the protocol ‘on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ 
added to the Amsterdam Treaty, which borrows the idea of subsidiarity 
as a ‘dynamic concept’64 from the Edinburgh Conclusions and restates 
that compliance with subsidiarity must be demonstrated by ‘qualitative 
or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators’.65 The Amsterdam Protocol 
59  European Council in Edinburgh, 11–12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency.
60  Ibid., 20.
61  Ibid.
62  Ibid., 23.
63  Inter-institutional declaration on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, Bull. EC 
10–1993, 119. The declaration is referred to rather by scholars than by the EU institutions 
themselves.
64  Article 3, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
65  Ibid., Article 4.
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echoes the requirement that both the ‘national insufficiency test’ and the 
‘comparative efficiency test’ must be met for subsidiarity compliance.66
In addition, the Amsterdam Protocol repeats the provisions regarding 
the form of action, which should be ‘as simple as possible’, and more specif-
ically fulfil the requirement of choosing directives over regulations.67 This 
provision is placed in the Amsterdam Protocol alongside the guidelines 
for the assessment of subsidiarity. In fact, the choice of the type of legal 
act can be seen to be much closer to the idea of a proportionality princi-
ple, as it rather concerns a ‘how’ question.68 The ‘General Approach’ of the 
Edinburgh Council is hence more accurate in this respect, as it placed the 
provision on the form of action under the third paragraph of Article 3b 
EC Treaty (‘nature and extent of Community action’), wherein the propor-
tionality principle is currently enshrined.69
At the time, the Edinburgh Guidelines and the Inter-Institutional 
Agreement were perceived as ‘vague and only indicative’.70 They did 
however represent an effort to make subsidiarity ‘operational’,71 suggest-
ing a procedural dimension to the subsidiarity principle and demanding 
that the Community conducts an inquiry before undertaking legisla-
tive steps.72 Similarly, the Amsterdam Protocol was also often regarded 
as a mere extract of the central principles established in the Edinburgh 
‘Overall Approach’, thereby not adding much value in itself.73 Nonetheless, 
the Amsterdam criteria are today still referred to in the subsidiarity assess-
ments of the Commission74 and national parliaments alike.75 Neither 
66  Ibid., Article 5.
67  Ibid., Article 6.
68  So also qualified in Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen 
Union (above n. 38), 567. De Búrca sees these provisions as ‘the linkage’ between subsidi-
arity and proportionality. See also de Búrca, ‘Re-Appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after 
Amsterdam’ (above n. 1), 30.
69  Conclusions of the Presidency (above n. 59), 212.
70  I. Pernice, ‘Framework Revisited: Constitutional, Federal and Subsidiarity Issues’ (1995) 2 
CJEL 403, 408.
71  C. Timmermans, ‘Subsidiarity and Transparency’ (1999) 22 Fordham International Law 
Journal 106, 108.
72  P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 195.
73  Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (above n. 38), 66.
74  Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 18th Report on Better 
Lawmaking covering the year 2010, COM (2011) 344, 2.
75  See e.g. House of Commons, ‘Reasoned Opinion on the Draft Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Improving the Gender Balance among Non-Executive 
Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures’, COM (2012) 
614.
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the Lisbon Treaty nor the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making of 2016 have provided any new criteria in this respect.
VI Enforcement within the EU
Whilst the Amsterdam Protocol established the conceptual criteria 
against which subsidiarity should be assessed in any given case, the role 
of subsidiarity in the EU’s governance is also shaped by its enforcement, 
primarily through the CJEU and national parliaments. This section dis-
cusses the relevant mechanisms for both institutions and highlights their 
limitations.
A Enforcement of Subsidiarity by the CJEU
The introduction of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty 
opened it to judicial enforcement by the CJEU. Initially it was expected 
that a flood of litigation might be triggered.76 However, since the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty subsidiarity challenges have played a role 
in fewer than twenty cases before the CJEU, with some of these repeating 
previous challenges.77
The CJEU’s jurisprudence on the subsidiarity principle78 has been 
widely criticised, in particular, the Court’s alleged unwillingness to ‘deal 
with subsidiarity frontally’ and its ‘misleading interpretation’ of the prin-
ciple, because of a focus on procedural aspects, instead of a more substan-
tive cost/benefit test for the necessity of EU action.79 Moreover, the Court’s 
case law has been described as a ‘drafting guide’, which means that, as long 
as EU institutions use the Court’s vague vocabulary and draft EU legisla-
tion accordingly, the Court has no ground to annul such an act on the basis 
76  Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (above n. 5), 1101.
77  P. Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (2012) 50 JCMS 72, 80. Some argue 
that the CJEU conducted subsidiarity review under a different heading, see T. Horsley, 
‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?’ 
(2012) 50 JCMS 267, 270.
78  See especially CJEU’s cases: Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council [1996] 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:431 (Working Time Directive); Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and 
Council [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:231 (Deposit-Guarantee Schemes); and Case C-491/01, 
British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:741.
79  G. Martinico, ‘Dating Cinderella: On Subsidiarity as a Political Safeguard of Federalism in 
the European Union’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 649, 655.
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of a subsidiarity violation.80 The Court was urged to develop a ‘doctrinal 
framework’ on subsidiarity to increase the transparency and justification 
of the legislative acts, instead of relying on the manifest-error doctrine.81
Partially the principle of subsidiarity itself is blamed for the low number 
of Court cases since it is seen as a ‘catch-all formula of good government 
and common sense, rather than a well-defined political or philosophical 
principle,’ and without ‘clear legal content’.82 Another given justification is 
the adherence of the Court to the separation of powers: the Court tried to 
avoid ‘substituting its own judgment for that of the institutions, in assess-
ing a choice which was ultimately perceived as political’.83 Another expla-
nation offered sees the ‘idea of integration’ as an important driver of CJEU 
jurisprudence, which may be endangered by the ‘anti-integration’ charac-
ter of the subsidiarity principle, which is directed specifically against the 
growth of EU competences.84 Finally, the low number of cases is explicated 
by the fact that adoption of legislative acts requires a qualified majority, 
implying that a sufficient number of Member States saw EU action in com-
pliance with subsidiarity.85
The CJEU has been under greater scrutiny due to the broadening of 
EU competences and the extension of majoritarian decision-making by 
the Lisbon Treaty.86 The Court is expected to enhance the control over the 
exercise of EU competences and advance a counter-majoritarian approach 
when reviewing EU legislation.87 Lack of the Court’s case law declaring a 
subsidiarity breach should not be preventing bringing such EU legislative 
acts before the Court.88 In this respect, the impact assessments attached 
80  S. Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: 
How the Court’s Case Law Has Become a Drafting Guide’ (2011) 12 GLJ 827.
81  M. Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (2006) 12 ELJ 503.
82  De Noriega, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (above n. 54), 96 and 139.
83  A. Biondi, ‘Subsidiarity in the Courtroom’ in Andrea Biondi et al. (eds.), EU Law after 
Lisbon (Oxford University Press, 2012), 213, and earlier Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity 
in the Maastricht Treaty’ (above n. 5), 1102.
84  De Noriega, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (above n. 54), 7. This approach 
of the members of the Court de Noriega drew from their doctrinal writings.
85  Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (above n. 77), 81.
86  M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai, ‘Introduction’ in M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past 
and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the 
Treaty of Rome (Hart, 2010), xix.
87  Ibid.
88  J. Ziller, ‘Le Principe de subsidiarité’ in J.-B. Auby and J. Dutheil de la Rochèr (eds.), Traité 
de droit administratif européen (Bruylant, 2014), 533.
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to draft legislative acts can possibly facilitate subsequent judicial review of 
subsidiarity.89
B Enforcement of Subsidiarity by National Parliaments
In contrast to enforcement by the CJEU, which itself is an unelected EU 
body, the involvement of national parliaments in the subsidiarity scrutiny 
embodies an aspect of EU governance that may help address concerns over 
democratic legitimacy, the EU’s so-called ‘democracy issue’.90 To analyse 
this issue it is useful to consider the notions of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legiti-
macy, two ‘legitimising beliefs’ for the exercise of governing authority.91  
Input-oriented legitimacy means that ‘political choices are legitimate 
if and because they reflect the “will of the people”, that is, if they can be 
derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community’.92 
Under output-oriented legitimacy ‘political choices are legitimate if and 
because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency 
in question’.93 Viewed from this perspective, the transfer of competence 
from the national level to the EU brings with it concerns over legitimisa-
tion if the EU authorities and laws fall short in input and output legitimacy 
relative to their national counterparts.
Several attempts have been made to address these concerns. The first 
approach has been to increase the role of the directly elected EP in the leg-
islative process. Indeed, the EP is the ‘winner’ in the Lisbon Treaty, due to 
the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, whereby decisions are 
taken jointly by the EP and the Council, and the conferral of more control 
over the appointment of the President of the EU Commission.94
The second attempt to strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy has 
been to reinforce the role of national parliaments within the European leg-
islative process. The Lisbon Treaty introduced the so-called Early Warning 
System (EWS) as a new way to safeguard subsidiarity that involves the 
national parliaments. This permits the national legislatures to be involved 
89  Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (above n. 77), 78.
90  J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 YLJ 2403, 2472.
91  F. W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 
1999), 6.
92  Ibid.
93  Ibid.
94  P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 
2010), 36.
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in the enforcement of the main principle by which a limit is placed on the 
exercise of shared powers by EU institutions.
Under this new procedure, the Commission, the EP and the Council 
shall forward draft legislative acts to national parliaments, providing a jus-
tification regarding the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality for 
each proposal, including a detailed statement to enable the appraisal of 
compliance with these principles.95 National parliaments are then granted 
eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act to sub-
mit a reasoned opinion to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission explaining why the draft is not in compli-
ance with the principle of subsidiarity.96 The institution from which the 
draft originates should ‘take account’ of the reasoned opinions received. 
Reasoned opinions count as votes: each national parliament has two votes; 
in a bicameral parliament, each of the two chambers has one vote. If the 
number of reasoned opinions exceeds certain thresholds, one of two pro-
cedures may be triggered.97
First, under the ‘yellow card’, if the reasoned opinions issued by national 
parliaments are equal to at least one-third of all the votes allocated to 
national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed. For proposals in the area 
of freedom, security and justice, the respective threshold is one-quarter of 
the votes of national parliaments. Subsequently, the initiating institution 
may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, and is require to 
give reasons for its decision.98
Second, in the procedure labelled as the ‘orange card’, if the reasoned 
opinions against a proposal within the ordinary legislative procedure 
represent at least the majority of votes assigned to national parliaments, 
the Commission must review the draft legislative act. The Commission 
may then decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. If it decides 
to maintain the draft, the Commission should present its own reasoned 
opinion on the compliance of the draft with the subsidiarity principle.99 
This reasoned opinion of the Commission, together with the reasoned 
opinions of the national parliaments, is then forwarded to the EU legisla-
tor for consideration. If a majority of 55 per cent of the votes in the Council 
or a majority of the votes cast in the EP is of the opinion that the proposal is 
contrary to the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative procedure is halted.
95  Protocol No. 2, Articles 4 and 5.
96  Ibid., Article 6.
97  Ibid., Article 7(1).
98  Ibid., Article 7(2).
99  Ibid., Article 7(3).
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The experience thus far suggests that national parliaments have been 
actively participating in the EWS. By the end of 2016 they have issued 350 
reasoned opinions.100 So far the ‘orange card’ has never been invoked, but 
the ‘yellow card’ has been triggered three times: for the so-called Monti II 
proposal on the right to strike; for the proposal establishing the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office; and for the proposal amending the Posted 
Workers Directive.101 In neither case did the reasoned opinions of the 
national parliaments convince the Commission of a subsidiarity breach. 
In the first case the Commission decided to withdraw the proposal follow-
ing the ‘yellow card’ because of the possible future lack of support in the 
EP and in the Council.102 In the second case it elected to continue to work 
on the proposal without any amendments but taking ‘due account’ of the 
reasoned opinions.103 This was not surprising especially since the Lisbon 
Treaty expressly provides that in a case of lack of unanimity on the proposal 
in the Council, nine Member States can proceed with enhanced coopera-
tion to establish the Office.104 In fact, in October 2017 the regulation estab-
lishing the EPPO was adopted by twenty Member States which were part 
of the EPPO enhanced cooperation at the time.105 Finally, in the case con-
cerning the amendment of the Posted Workers Directive the Commission 
decided to maintain the proposal.106 However, as of March 2018, the pro-
posed amendment has not yet been adopted by the EU legislator.
Overall, national parliaments see the EWS as in need of improvement. 
This concerns especially quality of the Commission replies to the reasoned 
100  Own calculation on the basis of Commission Annual Reports on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, COM (2011) 344; COM (2012) 373; COM (2013) 566; COM (2014) 506; 
COM (2015) 315; COM (2016) 469; and COM (2017) 600.
101  COM (2012) 130; COM (2013) 534; and COM (2016) 128 respectively. See F. Fabbrini and 
K. Granat, ‘“Yellow Card, but No Foul”: The Role of the National Parliaments under the 
Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right 
to Strike’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 115; D. Fromage, ‘The Second Yellow Card on the EPPO 
Proposal: An Encouraging Development for Member State Parliaments’ (2016) 36 YEL 
5–27.
102  See e.g. Commission reply to the Polish Sejm of 12 September 2012, Ares (2012)1058907.
103  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
National Parliaments, COM (2013) 851, 13.
104  Article 86(1) TFEU.
105  Council of the EU, Press Release 580/17, 12 October 2010.
106  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
National Parliaments on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting of Workers 
Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No. 2, 
COM (2016) 505.
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opinions, as well as adjustments in the eight-week deadline (e.g. by exclud-
ing the Christmas period and the parliamentary summer recess).107
Besides the EWS, Member States notify on behalf of a national parlia-
ment or its chamber an action on grounds of subsidiarity violation before 
the Court.108 Accordingly, the rules of action of annulment (Article 263 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) apply 
before the Court, while at the Member State level it is for national law to 
specify the rights of the parliament in this procedure.109 So far no such sub-
sidiarity action has ever been brought by national parliaments.
Viewed through the lens of input and output legitimacy, the EWS has 
arguably helped partially to address the EU’s democratic deficit. The for-
mal involvement of national parliaments, as well as their active use of the 
new tools, suggests that the preferences of the voters have received a greater 
voice in the EU legislative procedure, thereby improving input legitimacy. 
Furthermore, consistency with the subsidiarity principle ensures that gov-
ernment takes place at the level that is best placed to regulate specific func-
tions, thereby achieving better outcomes for the community. However, 
these potential improvements in legitimacy are limited by the apparent 
lack of consequences of the reasoned opinions issued by national parlia-
ments in the EWS. Many proposals for reform thus tend to focus on mak-
ing the input of national parliaments more consequential for the legislative 
outcome as discussed in greater detail in section VIII below.
VII The Subsidiarity Principle in Practice
As indicated above, an assessment of the subsidiary principle needs to 
consider the concrete implications of any enforcement mechanism. The 
following section therefore discusses the application of the subsidiarity 
principle in practice, both by the Court and by national parliaments, and 
argues that this can be challenging. Subsidiarity as a principle of govern-
ance helps to decide when the EU is more apt to enforce a certain policy; 
that is, whether its objective cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national 
level and can be better attained at the EU level. The ease with which this test 
can be applied depends on the policy area and the objectives at hand. This 
section illustrates this aspect by considering two specific areas of interest, 
107  COSAC, 24th Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and 
Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, 4 November 2015, 17 et seq.
108  Protocol No. 2, Article 8.
109  K. Granat, ‘Institutional Design of the Member States for the Ex Post Subsidiarity Scrutiny’ 
in M. Cartabia et al. (eds.), Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU (Il Mulino, 2013), 427.
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namely, internal market legislation and fundamental rights legislation. 
With regard to the achievement of the internal market, the problem is that 
it appears too easy to conclude that the subsidiarity principle points in the 
direction of undertaking certain action at the EU level, simply because of 
the inherent cross-border nature of the objective. With regard to the gov-
ernance of fundamental rights, issues arise if subsidiarity is simply applied 
mechanically, without due respect for the wider-ranging objectives of fun-
damental rights policy.
A Internal Market
The review of EU legislation based on Article 114 TFEU, such as the 
Tobacco Products Directive, underlines the deficiencies of the subsidi-
arity test.110 The national parliaments challenged the Commission pro-
posal for the Tobacco Products Directive under the EWS, issuing nine 
reasoned opinions.111 The reasoned opinions argued that the Commission 
did not prove disparities between tobacco products in the Member States 
and therefore did not establish the presence of a threat to the functioning 
of the internal market.112 It was also underlined that the Member States 
have already contributed to increasing health protection by measures such 
as banning smoking in public spaces or selling in vending machines.113 
Moreover some parliaments underlined that the large number of foreseen 
delegated acts impeded subsidiarity assessment of the proposal.114
The threshold for the ‘yellow card’ was not reached and the EU legislator 
adopted the proposal with some changes in 2014. The Directive prohib-
its cigarettes with characterising flavours (e.g. menthol) and introduces 
health warnings on packages of tobacco and related products which con-
sist of a picture and text health warnings covering 65 per cent of the front 
and back of the packages. Moreover, it provides safety and quality require-
ments for electronic cigarettes.
Subsequently, three cases concerning the new Directive were brought 
before the Court. Some of the challenges contested whether the prohibition 
110  COM (2012) 788.
111  Two of those reasoned opinions (Bulgarian parliament and Italian Chamber of Deputies) 
were issued after the eight-week deadline.
112  Reasoned opinion of the Greek parliament, 20 February 2013, 4.
113  Reasoned opinion of the Bulgarian parliament, 28 February 2013, 2.
114  Reasoned opinions of the Danish parliament, 4 March 2013, 1; the Italian Senate, 30 March 
2013, 1; and the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 26 February 2013, 1.
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of menthol cigarettes115 and the new rules on e-cigarettes complied with 
Article 5(3) TEU.116 The cases show the Court’s reasoning and appear to 
provide the most structured discussion of subsidiarity to date in the case 
law. The Court’s Advocate General (AG) provided the most extensive opin-
ion in the Poland v. Parliament and Council case, referring to that opinion 
in the other proceedings.117 This is therefore the opinion that is reviewed in 
this chapter to show the challenges of subsidiarity analysis with regard to 
legislation based on Article 114 TFEU.
The AG included in the subsidiarity review an analysis of the substance of 
the EU measure and of the statement of reasons.118 Within the substantive 
test, the AG outlined two different limbs of the test, one negative and one 
positive, which de facto represent simply different labels for the national 
insufficiency test and comparative efficiency test discussed earlier.119  
Under the negative limb the AG enumerated three components: (1) the 
technical and financial capabilities of the Member States to resolve the 
problem; (2) the national, regional and local features central to the issue 
at stake; and (3) the cross-border dimension of the problem that is impos-
sible to address at national level.120
Of these, the last one appears to be the most important and the AG’s 
opinion focused on it. As was shown earlier, the Amsterdam Protocol 
referred to this test as a guideline to justify action at the EU level.121 The 
‘cross-border activity test’ was also used in the earlier Vodafone case in the 
opinion of AG Maduro,122 who argued that the EU should act whenever 
it had ‘a special interest in protecting and promoting economic activities 
of a cross-border character’, and that ‘the national democratic process is 
likely to fail to protect cross-border activities’.123 Generally speaking, the 
EU should take action in cases where the transnational dimension of an 
115  C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:325; and C-358/14, 
Poland v. Parliament and Council [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:323.
116  C-477/14, Pillbox 38 [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:324.
117  Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 23 December 2015, C-358/14, Poland v. Parliament 
and Council [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:848. According to the AG, the Philip Morris 
Brands and Others and Pillbox 38 cases concern subsidiarity ‘only briefly’ (see [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:853, para. 273 and [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:854, para. 159 respectively).
118  Opinion of AG Kokott, C-358/14, para. 140.
119  Ibid., para. 142.
120  Ibid., paras. 151–3.
121  Article 5 of Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
122  Case C-58/08, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Vodafone and Others [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:596.
123  Ibid., para. 34.
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issue means that national processes may fail, in turn increasing the added 
value of EU legislative intervention.124
The AG indicated that ‘as a rule’ Member States cannot sufficiently 
achieve the aim of Article 114 TFEU which is elimination of obstacles to 
cross-border trade.125 In this context, Poland argued that marketing of 
menthol-flavoured tobacco does not have a cross-border dimension. This 
was due to diverse consumption patterns and economic structures among 
the Member States, and the possibility to provide ‘health-related action’ 
by the Member States with the biggest markets (Poland, Slovakia and 
Finland).126 However, the AG disagreed and underlined that the objective 
of the Directive – removal of obstacles for the trade of tobacco products 
and a simultaneous guarantee of a high level of health protection – can 
be achieved only when all characterising flavours are prohibited.127 The 
AG pointed out that differences in the Member States are irrelevant: the 
key question is whether there is or will be cross-border trade in this area 
and whether the Member States can ‘efficiently’ remove these obstacles 
on their own.128 The AG concluded that there exists a ‘lively’ cross-border 
trade in the tobacco market, with different national rules on characteris-
ing flavours, leading to a problem that the Member States cannot tackle 
themselves. Thus, the EU legislator did not commit a manifest error in its 
subsidiarity assessment.129 Already this part of the AG’s reasoning shows 
that when cross-border trade is concerned, EU level regulation almost 
automatically wins.
With regard to the positive limb of the subsidiarity test, the AG framed 
this test as a question of ‘added value’ meaning that ‘the general interests 
of the European Union can be better served by action at that level than by 
action at the national level’.130 Although, as the AG pointed out, this might 
be an ‘automatic’ case with regard to Article 114 TFEU legislation, it still 
124  Establishing that an activity has a cross-border character and thus demands an EU action 
is not always a straightforward task. For example, AG Maduro in the Vodafone case dis-
tinguished between the harmonisation of the wholesale and retail roaming prices. While 
it was hard to dispute that wholesale roaming prices had a cross-border character, the 
Member States could have regulated retail prices after the harmonisation of the wholesale 
prices. Yet, AG Maduro explained that EU-level regulation of the retail prices was indis-
pensable, as they represented only a small part of domestic communications and thus there 
was a risk that the national regulator will not protect this cross-border activity.
125  Opinion of AG Kokott, C-358/14, para. 154.
126  Ibid., para. 155.
127  Ibid., para. 157.
128  Ibid., para. 158.
129  Ibid., paras. 159–60.
130  Ibid., para. 162.
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demands a quantitative and qualitative test.131 The AG established that the 
market at stake has a ‘substantial trade volume and affects the lives of mil-
lions of Union citizens every day’ (‘quantitative test’) and that the issue 
at stake is ‘beyond national boundaries’ confirming a common European 
interest (‘qualitative test’).132 Again, no manifest error of assessment was 
evident in the Commission’s reasoning and hence the Directive passed 
also the positive aspect of the subsidiarity test.133
Finally, the AG assessed the procedural subsidiarity angle, since Poland 
argued that the Commission’s Directive is insufficiently justified, as only 
one recital of the Directive’s preamble concerns subsidiarity.134 The AG 
agreed that the Directive only repeated the text of Article 5(3) TEU.135 
Despite this ‘empty formula’ used by the EU legislator, the AG found that 
other recitals in the preamble, even though they do not directly reference 
subsidiarity but rather justify the use of Article 114 TFEU, are nonetheless 
relevant to the issue at stake due to the overlap in the reasoning applicable 
to internal market and subsidiarity provisions.136 Moreover, the AG under-
lined that the explanatory memorandum in the Commission proposal 
and the impact assessment discussed the insufficiency of national rules 
and the added value of EU action and were available to EU institutions and 
national parliaments in the legislative procedure.137 Still, the AG advised 
the EU legislature to avoid ‘empty formulas’ and substantiate the preamble 
with regard to the subsidiarity principle in future legislative acts.138 In sum, 
the AG found that the EU violated neither the substantial nor the proce-
dural aspect of the subsidiarity principle.139
The Court in its judgments confirmed that the Directive’s provisions 
prohibiting placing on the market mentholated tobacco products in the 
Philip Morris Brands and Others and in Poland v. Parliament and Council 
cases and the rules applicable to electronic cigarettes and to refill contain-
ers in the Pillbox 38 case are compatible with the principle of subsidiarity.140 
The Court established that the initial, political review of subsidiarity is in 
the hands of national parliaments while the Court has to decide whether 
131  Ibid., paras. 164–5.
132  Ibid., para. 167.
133  Ibid., para. 168.
134  Ibid., para. 175.
135  Ibid., para. 177.
136  Ibid., para. 180.
137  Ibid., paras. 182–5.
138  Ibid., para. 188.
139  Ibid., para. 189.
140  See C-547/14, paras. 213–28; and C-477/14, paras. 142–51.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316417027.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 19 Feb 2019 at 14:52:38, subject to the Cambridge Core
 subsidiarity as a principle of eu governance 295
the EU legislature ‘was entitled to consider, on the basis of a detailed state-
ment, that the objective of the proposed action cannot be better achieved 
at EU level’.141
The Court indicated that the objectives of the Directive were 
‘interdependent’.142 Even if the objective of the Directive to ensure a 
high level of protection of human health could be better achieved at the 
national level, its other objective, improvement of the functioning of the 
internal market for tobacco, would be shattered if the menthol-flavoured 
tobacco would be permitted in some Member States and prohibited in 
others.143 In this light, the EU was better placed to achieve the objectives 
of the Directive. In addition, the subsidiarity principle does not aim at 
setting limits on EU action based on the situation in a specific Member 
State assessed individually but instead demands that action can be bet-
ter achieved at EU level because of the Treaty objectives.144 The Court 
disagreed that the objective of human health protection could be better 
achieved at the national level, since menthol cigarettes are consumed 
only in three Member States. In fact, at least an additional eight Member 
States had a market share greater than the EU-wide share.145 With regard 
to the procedural aspect of the claim, the Court argued that the wording 
of the Directive, as well as its context and the circumstances of the case 
have to be taken into account. The CJEU concluded that both the pro-
posal and the impact assessment offered ‘sufficient information’ showing 
‘clearly and unequivocally’ the benefits of EU action.146 Because Poland 
participated in the legislative procedure it could not claim to be unaware 
of the grounds behind the Directive.147 In turn, in the assessment of the 
proportionality principle, the Court considered a procedural requirement 
that any burden upon the economic operators should be minimised and 
commensurate with the sought objective as per Article 5 of Protocol No. 2. 
The jobs and revenue lost due to the prohibition were mitigated by the 
transitional period until 2020 and by the expected decrease in the number 
of smokers.148
141  C-358/14, paras. 112 and 114.
142  Ibid., para. 118.
143  Ibid., para. 117.
144  Ibid., para. 119.
145  Ibid., para. 120.
146  Ibid., paras. 122–3.
147  Ibid., para. 125.
148  Ibid., paras. 100–1.
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Clearly, the reasoning of the Court is much more succinct in comparison 
to the AG Opinions, not breaking down the subsidiarity assessment into 
positive and negative limbs. Moreover, with regard to the procedural aspect 
the CJEU is much more generous towards the EU legislature, and does not 
criticise the use of wording in the preamble. In addition, the Court draws 
a clear distinction between the political and judicial review of subsidiarity 
in the Directive. This is even more visible in the Pillbox 38 case where the 
Court did not give any thought to the reasoned opinions issued during 
the legislative procedure, stating that the reasoned opinions are part of the 
political monitoring of subsidiarity principle under Protocol No. 2.149
The case highlights the difficulties of enforcing subsidiarity in practice, 
in particular in instances concerning the internal market, where an almost 
automatic prejudice for EU action appears to apply. Nonetheless, one can 
argue that despite the evident cross-border implications of internal market 
issues, a meaningful subsidiarity review may still be applied, if a profound 
study of the issue at stake is offered by the impact assessment. Moreover, 
subsidiarity could be tied to the question of the harmonisation method 
chosen by the EU and whether the adopted approach minimises the disrup-
tion necessary to achieve the stated objectives.150 Yet, this approach seems 
closer to the proportionality review since it concerns the applied means.
B Fundamental Rights
The second area that exposes the difficulties in the application of the sub-
sidiarity principle concerns EU legislative proposals or acts with a fun-
damental rights objective. It has been argued that ‘[t]here is mismatch 
between the function of the principle of subsidiarity as defined in EU 
law and the function of fundamental rights standard-setting in the EU’.151 
Legislative acts that express a fundamental right (or as is used in this 
chapter, those with a fundamental rights objective) often concern rela-
tions within Member States rather than among them.152 Moreover, the 
nature of fundamental rights, their focus on values, stands in contrast to a 
149  C-477/14, para. 147. The referring national court invoked the reasoned opinions of 
national parliaments arguing subsidiarity violation by the Tobacco Products Directive and 
no proof of divergent national regulation for electronic cigarettes.
150  R. Schütze, ‘Deciding when the EU Should Act’, Durham Law School Research Briefing 
no. 26 (2015).
151  E. Muir, ‘The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional 
Challenges’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 219, 240.
152  Ibid.
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subsidiarity test that concentrates on the effectiveness of the government 
level at stake.153 The example of the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal and the 
reasoned opinions issued in this respect highlight the problems at stake.
In 2012 the Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive to 
promote gender equality in economic decision-making, specifically on 
boards of companies listed on stock exchanges.154 The proposal followed 
up on an earlier, rather unsuccessful, pledge of the Commission encour-
aging self-regulation of publicly listed companies to increase the number 
of women on boards.155 The proposed Directive set a target of 40 per cent 
for women in director positions on non-executive boards by 2020, or by 
2018 in case of listed companies that are public undertakings.156 Crucially, 
in the selection procedure, the female candidate is chosen when she has 
equal qualification to a male candidate in terms of suitability, competence 
and professional performance, unless an objective assessment taking 
account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the balance 
in favour of the male candidate. The proposal put forward some examples 
of sanctions for infringements of national provisions implementing the 
Directive with regard to the selection process (e.g. administrative fines or 
annulment of the appointment).157
The proposal was anchored in the EU competence to adopt measures 
ensuring the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women.158 In support of the consistency of the pro-
posal with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission underlined the 
legal diversity in the Member States which resulted in a range from 3 per 
cent to 27 per cent of women within the boards.159 Relying on its Impact 
Assessment, the Commission emphasised that female representation on 
boards will not reach 40 per cent by 2020 without further measures. The 
legal diversity across Member States was apt to produce problems in the 
functioning of the internal market, such as exclusion from public procure-
ment, because of the lack of compliance with national binding quotas in 
153  Ibid., 241.
154  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the 
gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges 
and related measures, COM (2012) 614.
155  ‘Women on the Board Pledge for Europe’ MEMO/11/124, 1 March 2011, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-11–124_en.htm. The pledge was signed only by twenty-four 
companies.
156  Article 4 of the proposal.
157  Article 7(2) of the proposal.
158  Article 157(3) TFEU.
159  Explanatory Memorandum, 9.
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another Member State. In sum, as only an EU-level action could effectively 
achieve a 40 per cent quota allowing for equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
and diminish the internal market related problems, the proposal was in 
conformity with the subsidiarity principle.
Eight parliamentary chambers issued reasoned opinions on this pro-
posal, and the threshold for the ‘yellow card’ was not met. The Czech 
Chamber of Deputies and the Danish Folketing highlighted a subsidiarity 
violation, since affirmative measures should be taken by national initia-
tives.160 The UK House of Commons stated that the Commission did not 
offer strong evidence on the cause of female underrepresentation and 
the problems encountered within the internal market that would justify 
the EU action.161 Another chamber established a subsidiarity violation 
by the draft Directive on the basis that it focused only on non-executive 
boards requiring less specialist knowledge and hence confirming gen-
der stereotypes.162 Finally, some parliaments argued that reforms at the 
national level have recently begun.163
This study of the reasoned opinions indicates that they were predomi-
nantly issued by national parliaments of Member States that had no exist-
ing legal quota and relatively high shares of women on boards. In those 
Member States corporate governance codes often regulate gender equality 
matters. In contrast, national parliaments of Member States with relatively 
low shares of women on boards tended not to submit a reasoned opinion.
Arguably despite the Commission’s protestations to the contrary, the 
‘Women on Boards’ proposal only marginally concerned situations of a 
truly transnational context, with substantive cross-border effects. Such 
a case would exist in only a limited set of cases; for instance, if a female 
member of a non-executive board applied for a similar position in 
another Member State in accordance with the free movement rules.164 The 
proposed Directive – an example of a genuine fundamental rights 
legislation – however forced national parliaments to assess whether gen-
der equality should be offered better protection, although an explicit 
cross-border dimension was not present. In fact, there have been cases 
160  Reasoned opinions of the Czech Chamber of Deputies, 6 December 2012, point 5; and the 
Danish parliament, 14 December 2012, 1.
161  Reasoned opinion of the UK House of Commons, 18 December 2012, point 22.
162  Reasoned opinion of the Polish Chamber of Deputies, 4 January 2013, 4.
163  Reasoned opinion of the Dutch Tweede and Eerste Kamer, 18 December 2012, 1.
164  Recital 13 of the proposal’s preamble.
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where fundamental rights legislation concerned transnational situations, 
for example the Commission proposal on the right to strike.
In the area of fundamental rights, a more open-ended approach to sub-
sidiarity based on the issues of ‘process’, ‘outcome’ (capacity of the levels of 
authority to deal with certain issues) and ‘willingness’ rather than simply 
treating it as an efficiency measure may be called for.165 For example, on the 
one hand, in terms of process and willingness, fundamental rights issues 
may best be dealt with at the national level, because this has ‘the informa-
tion, the capacity and the political legitimacy to intervene’.166 On the other 
hand, process and willingness also suggest that the EU or international 
level might be better placed to act as it is ‘less mired in the immediacy of 
a local political situation [and] is the more appropriate actor in certain 
human rights matters, since it is more likely to have the will, the inde-
pendence, the wider experience and the normative authority to act’.167 As 
regards outcome, the national level may be better placed to protect fun-
damental rights through constitutional values and political institutions, 
while monitoring of existing national protections might be better dealt 
with at the international level.168 As these examples show, the result of this 
multifaceted assessment is an ‘inevitable interaction between those differ-
ent levels and actors in adopting and carrying through a particular policy 
in a given sphere’.
In this light, the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal may improve the situation 
in those Member States lagging behind in gender equality. For instance, 
Malta, Hungary and Greece had very low shares of women on boards, 
ranging between 3 and 6 per cent. The EU Directive could assist these 
Member States in overcoming national problems, such as the entrenched 
positions of national parties on the issue of women in society. The ‘Women 
on Boards’ proposal thus presented a more suitable measure to move 
towards gender equality on companies’ boards as compared to a national 
level regulation.
This discussion of the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal highlights the issues 
arising in the application of the subsidiarity principle to fundamental 
rights legislation. A purely efficiency-based assessment may fail to do jus-
tice to the more wide-ranging ambitions of fundamental rights and their 
importance for the EU. Like proposals concerning the internal market, 
165  De Búrca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ (above n. 1), 2–3.
166  Ibid., 4.
167  Ibid.
168  Ibid.
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proposals that have as their objective the protection of fundamental rights 
put a spotlight on certain limits and basic problems with the application 
of the subsidiarity principle in practice, thereby motivating the search for 
proposals to reform the current practice.
VIII Reform Proposals
Over time, the EWS as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has been perceived 
as insufficient for safeguarding against the EU’s ‘competence creep’. For 
example, both the Netherlands and the UK have conducted systematic and 
wide-ranging reviews of EU legislation to assess whether and how the EU 
should act.
The Dutch report has shown that EU proposals raise concerns with 
regard to their proportionality and substance.169 With regard to the sub-
sidiarity principle itself, some ‘points of action’ in the report clearly high-
lighted that the issue at stake ‘can best take place at national level’ or that 
they do not have a ‘transnational character’. However, in this assessment 
the Dutch tested only the national insufficiency prong of the subsidiarity 
principle, without looking into the EU’s comparative efficiency.170
The British ‘Balance of Competences Review’ produced a series of 
reports on the effects of EU law on the UK legal system. In a report dedi-
cated to the subsidiarity and proportionality principles it stated that the 
evidence on how subsidiarity is applied in practice is ‘mixed’: on the one 
hand respect for subsidiarity is growing; on the other hand subsidiarity 
has not proven to be an effective brake on EU legislation.171 Since the out-
come of the ‘Balance of Competences Review’ generally did not confirm 
the UK government’s position, especially with regard to free movement, 
the British delegations did not use it in the negotiations with in the EU.172
169  Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Testing European legislation for subsidiarity and pro-
portionality – Dutch list of points for action. See also Michael Emerson, ‘The Dutch Wish-
List for a Lighter Regulatory Touch from the EU’, CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2013, http://
ceps.eu/book/dutch-wish-list-lighter-regulatory-touch-eu.
170  See A. Duff, ‘Why the Dutch Version of the Balance of Competence Review 
Will Not Please the Brits’ (2013), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/08/27/
why-the-dutch-version-of-the-balance-of-competence-review-will-not-please-the-brits/.
171  Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, Subsidiarity and Proportionality, para. 2.32.
172  C. O’Brien, ‘Cameron’s Renegotiation and the Burying of the Balance of Competencies 
Review’, http://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-renegotiation-and-the-burying-of-the-balance-
of-competencies-review/. Also, the House of Lords criticised lack of publicity of the 
review and lack of any overall summary of the findings of the reports. See House of Lords, 
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The Dutch and the British reports suggest that countering the compe-
tence creep of the EU cannot be the main reason why national parliaments 
should be involved in the EU legislative process. Instead, the main rea-
son for enhancing of the role of national parliaments in the EU lies in the 
democratic legitimacy that their involvement brings to EU legislation. In 
line with this view, the UK in the renegotiation process of its EU mem-
bership called for ‘a bigger and more significant role for national parlia-
ments’ to bring about democratic accountability.173 The negotiations of UK 
membership in the EU have led to what is termed ‘Tusk’s proposal’ putting 
forward a number of issues such as competitiveness, Eurozone relations 
and sovereignty, which included a section on proposed amendments to 
the EWS.174
In Tusk’s proposal national parliaments may submit reasoned opinions 
stating that an EU draft legislative act violates the principle of subsidiarity 
submitted within twelve weeks from the transmission of that draft. If these 
reasoned opinions represent more than 55 per cent of votes allocated to 
national parliaments (i.e. at least thirty-one of the fifty-six available votes), 
the opinions will be ‘comprehensively discussed’ in the Council. If the EU 
draft legislative proposal is not changed in a way reflecting the concerns of 
national parliaments in their reasoned opinions, the Council will discon-
tinue the consideration of that draft.
This proposal differs from the current ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card 
schemes of the Lisbon Treaty in a number of ways concerning in particular 
the timeframe, applicable thresholds and the effects of these procedures. 
First, Tusk’s proposal gives national parliaments more time for the analysis 
of proposals and drafting reasoned opinions as compared to the current 
eight-week deadline. Second, although the mechanism of assignment of 
votes to national parliaments remains unchanged, Tusk’s proposal offers 
a different threshold of votes to be met by national parliaments: whilst at 
least nineteen are necessary for a ‘yellow card’ and at least twenty-nine for 
an ‘orange card’, thirty-one are required to meet the threshold in Tusk’s 
proposal. The new procedure thus requires only slightly more votes than 
the existing ‘yellow’ and ‘orange card’. Third, the most substantial change 
European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2014–15, ‘The Review of the Balance 
of Competences between the UK and the EU’, 18.
173  David Cameron, EU speech at Bloomberg, delivered 23 January 2013, www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.
174  Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, EUCO 
4/16, 2 February 2016.
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concerns the consequences of activating the new procedure. Tusk’s pro-
posal insists on stopping the legislative procedure if the requests of national 
parliaments are not met, while the ‘orange card’ provided for discontinua-
tion only if the Council finds a subsidiarity breach.
On the one hand Tusk’s proposal seems to demand a more active 
response from EU institutions than the ‘orange card’. On the other hand, 
and crucially in light of the perception of the initiative, Tusk’s proposal 
does not grant national parliaments a veto power on any aspect of a 
Commission proposal. Tusk’s proposal makes discontinuation of the legis-
lative procedure conditional on the non-accommodation of the ‘concerns’ 
expressed in the reasoned opinions, with the ultimate decision taken by 
the Council, and thereby away from the national parliaments. In contrast, 
the rejected ‘red card’ initiative proposed in the Convention on the Future 
of Europe asked for a requirement of the Commission to withdraw its pro-
posal in light of opposition from a two-thirds majority of national parlia-
ments. Compared to this initiative, Tusk’s proposal can hardly be seen as a 
‘red card’.175 However, avoiding the introduction of a veto for national par-
liaments without further checks may be regarded as one of the benefits of 
the Tusk’s proposal, as it prevents adding another veto player to the already 
often lengthy horse-trading over EU policy.
Finally, discussion in the Council could also mean that depending on 
the relationship between parliaments and their governments represented 
in the Council, ministers might show more or less flexibility with the ‘con-
cerns’ of their own national parliaments and thus affect whether a con-
sensus on stopping or continuing with the legislative procedure can be 
achieved.
As this final limit of Tusk’s proposal suggests, a substantive strengthen-
ing of the role of national parliaments could take place by granting them 
more control over their governments in the Council. One of the ways that 
has been suggested to achieve this greater role for national parliaments 
would be to adopt a procedure similar to some existing national proce-
dures with regard to the so-called flexibility clause expressed in Article 
352 TFEU.176 This clause allows the EU to act by unanimous decision of 
the Council where this is necessary to achieve one of the stated objectives 
of the Treaties even in cases where the EU does not yet have the requisite 
175  CONV 540/03, 6 February 2003, 3.
176  See R. Schütze, ‘Reply to Call for Evidence Questions on Subsidiarity, 
Proportionality, and Article 352 TFEU’, www.gov.uk/government/consultations/
subsidiarity-and-proportionality-review-of-the-balance-of-competences.
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powers. In Germany and the UK a parliamentary approval in the form of 
an act of the national parliament is necessary before the representative of 
the government in the Council can support a draft legislative act based 
on Article 352 TFEU in the Council.177 Of course, demanding an act of 
parliament for every EU legislative act might have a negative impact on 
the speed and efficiency of the decision-making. Even worse, the appli-
cability of this mechanism to every EU legislative draft may diminish the 
value of such a procedure, making the parliament act ex officio or simply 
rubber-stamping approvals. This is why a requirement of prior agreement 
by parliament should be limited to the most important cases, specifically 
those where a national parliament has issued a reasoned opinion at an ear-
lier stage of the EU legislative procedure. Such an approach would likely 
also make the approval process more deliberate. The number of reasoned 
opinions issued would then provide the EU institutions with a more accu-
rate indication of possible opposition in the Council. For example, in the 
case of the Tobacco Products Directive, only the Polish representative 
voted against the proposal in the Council, even though its own parliament 
did not adopt a reasoned opinion.178 A final advantage of strengthening 
national parliaments through the national Rules of Procedures of the par-
liamentary constitutions is that it would not demand an EU Treaty amend-
ment and may thus be easier to achieve.
The proposals discussed here share a common focus on the outcome 
of parliamentary involvement. They seek to ensure that substantial dis-
approval by national parliaments has consequences for the EU legislative 
procedure, without giving the parliaments an outright veto on legislation. 
They can thus be usefully considered as targeting the output legitimacy of 
the EU.
IX Conclusion
This chapter has studied the role of the subsidiarity principle in the gov-
ernance of the EU. It has shown the development of subsidiarity from its 
conceptual roots in the papal Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno through its 
incubation period in the German Basic Law to its formal introduction to 
the EU in the Maastricht Treaty. With the Lisbon Treaty, the subsidiarity 
177  European Union Act 2011, s. 8; §8 Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der Integrations-
verantwortung des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union (IntVG).
178  See Council of the EU, 7763/14, 14 March 2014.
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principle gained a new enforcement mechanism, beyond the CJEU, in the 
form of the EWS.
The analysis of two areas of competence, the internal market and fun-
damental rights, and the enforcement of subsidiarity either by the CJEU 
or national parliaments, identified conceptual and practical limitations 
inherent in the current use of subsidiarity as a principle of governance. 
These problems suggest that in its current practice subsidiarity may be 
unable to deliver fully on its promised benefits for limiting the EU compe-
tence creep and addressing the democratic deficit of the EU institutions.
Reforms currently under discussion focus predominantly on improv-
ing the output legitimacy through procedural tweaks, such as the red card 
‘light’ of Tusk’s proposal, although with the result of the UK referendum 
on 23 June 2016 on so-called Brexit indicating a preference to leave the 
EU the future of these proposals remains highly uncertain. As the analysis 
of the application of subsidiarity in the areas of the internal market and 
fundamental rights policy has shown, more substantial rethinking of the 
conceptual core of subsidiarity, beyond the established national ineffi-
ciency and EU comparative efficiency tests, may be necessary to perfect 
the subsidiarity principle as a governance tool that achieves a desirable 
balance between the EU and its constituent components.
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